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Abstract In this paper, we study the problem of precision matrix estimation when the dataset
contains sensitive information. In the differential privacy framework, we develop a differentially private
ridge estimator by perturbing the sample covariance matrix. Then we develop a differentially private
graphical lasso estimator by using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) algorithm.
The theoretical results and empirical results that show the utility of the proposed methods are also
provided.
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1 Introduction
Precision matrix plays a fundamental role in many statistical inference problems. For example,
in discriminant analysis, the precision matrix needs to be estimated to compute the classification
rules[1]. In graphical models, the structure exploration of gaussian graphical model is equivalent
to recover the support of the precision matrix[2]. Moreover, the precision matrix is useful for
a wide range of applications including portfolio optimization, genomics and single processing,
among many others. Therefore, it is of great importance to estimate the precision matrix.
Given a p × n data matrix X, a sample of n realizations from a p-dimensional Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ∗. A natural way to estimate precision
matrix Θ∗ = Σ∗−1 is via maximum likelihood approach. Under the Gaussian setting, the
negative log-likelihood takes the form
− log |Θ|+ tr(SΘ), (1.1)
where S = XXT /n is the sample covariance matrix and tr(·) denotes the trace of the matrix.
Then minimizing (1.1) with respect to Θ yields the maximum likelihood estimate of the precision
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matrix. Due to the maximum likelihood estimate performs poorly and beyond compute in high-
dimensional setting, the penalized log-likelihood functions and other constrained optimization
techniques are used to gain better estimates of the matrix. These alternative methods can
be coarsely sorted into two types. One is to seek the sparsity in the precision matrix to
explore the structure of the Gaussian graphical model. The graphical lasso [3–5] is a popular
technique among sparse approaches, which penalizes (1.1) with the l1 norm to induce sparsity
and minimizes the penalized log-likelihood
− log |Θ|+ tr(SΘ) + λ‖Θ‖1, (1.2)
over all positive definite matrices Θ. Here ‖ · ‖1 denotes the sum of the absolute values of the
entries, and λ is a nonnegative tuning parameter. Other sparse approaches can be seen in Cai et
al. [6], Yuan and Wang [7] and Liu and Luo [8], among others. Another approach is to construct
shrinkage estimates of the matrix, which might be useful when the true matrix is non-sparse.
Many results on this topic were developed to estimate the covariance matrix, which includes
Ledoit and Wolf [9], Warton [10] and Deng and Tsui [11]. Recently, van Wieringen and Peeters
[12] and Kuismin et al. [13] proposed a ridge-type estimation for the precision matrix, which
penalizes (1.1) with the squared Frobenius norm and minimizes the penalized log-likelihood
− log |Θ|+ tr(SΘ) + λ‖Θ‖2F , (1.3)
over all positive definite matrices Θ. Here λ is a nonnegative tuning parameter, and ‖ · ‖F
denotes the square root of the sum of the squares of the entries. The advantage of (1.3) is that
there is an analytical expression for the precision matrix estimation.
All of the aforementioned approaches do not make any distinction between sensitive data
and non sensitive data. However in real-world data, a large number of datasets contain personal
sensitive information. For example, datasets related to portfolio optimization may contain per-
sonal financial information, and datasets related to gene expression may contain personal health
information. The availability of large datasets containing sensitive information from individuals
has motivated the study of learning algorithms that guarantee the privacy of individuals who
contribute to the database. A strict and widely used privacy guarantee is via the concept of
differential privacy [14]. It requires that datasets differing in only one entry induce similar
distribution on the output of a algorithm, which will provides strong provable protection to in-
dividuals and prevents them from being recognized by an arbitrarily powerful adversary. Thus,
it is significant to study the estimation of the precision matrix under the differential privacy
framework.
Recently, Wang et al.[15] studied the differentially private sparse precision matrix estimation
problem from the model perspective. In this paper, we study the differentially private precision
matrix estimation problem from the algorithm perspective. Specifically, we design differentially
private algorithms for the ridge-type estimation model (1.3) and the graphical lasso problem
(1.2). We first develop a differentially private algorithm for the ridge-type estimation of the
precision matrix. Note that when the tuning parameter is fixed, the solution of model (1.3) is
determined by the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of S. Thus we provide the differential privacy
by perturbing S. We then develop a differentially private algorithm for the graphical lasso.
Inspired by the post-processing nature of the differential privacy, if an algorithm can been
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decomposed into stable and unstable parts, and only at the stable parts the algorithm access
the raw data. Then, satisfying the differential privacy in stable parts will make the whole
algorithm satisfy the differential privacy. Note that the ADMM algorithm for the graphical
lasso [16] consists of three steps, but only step 2 accesses the raw dataset. Moreover, this step
corresponds to a ridge-type penalty log-likelihood estimation problem similar to model (1.3).
Thus, we might perform a differentially private algorithm in this step and then treat other steps
as a post-processing step, which will not increase the privacy risk. The theoretical guarantees
on the performance of our privacy preserving precision matrix estimation algorithms are also
established. Numerical studies show the utility of our privacy preserving algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the differential privacy
and the ADMM algorithm in Section 2. In Section 3, we develop differentially private algorithms
in the context of precision matrix estimation. The theoretical guarantees on the performance
of our differentially private algorithms was provided in Section 4. We then test our algorithms
under simulation and real data in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the background of the differential privacy, some related privacy
notions, and the ADMM algorithm for the graphical lasso.
2.1 Differentially privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a rigorous and common definition of the privacy protection of data
analysis algorithm [14, 17]. Let the space of data be Y and datasets Y, Y ′ ∈ Yn. We use the
Hamming distance, denoted by dH(Y, Y
′), to measure the distance between datasets Y and Y ′,
that is, the number of data points on which they differ. If dH(Y, Y
′) = 1, we call they are
neighboring, meaning that we can get Y ′ by changing one of the data points in Y .
Definition 2.1 ([17]) A randomized algorithmM is (, δ)-differentially private if for all neigh-
boring datasets Y and Y ′ and for all measurable set S ⊆ Range(M) the following holds
Pr(A(Y ) ∈ S) ≤ ePr(A(Y ′) ∈ S) + δ. (2.1)
If δ = 0, we say that M is -differentially private.
We observe that if algorithm M that provides -differential privacy also provides (, δ)-
differential privacy. As a result, the -differential privacy is much stronger. Here , δ are
privacy budget parameters, the smaller they are, the stronger the privacy guarantee. From this
definition, it is clear that if we arbitrarily change any individual data point in a dataset, the
output of the algorithm does not shift too much.
Dwork et al. [14] also provide a framework for developing privacy preserving algorithms
by adding noise with a designed distribution to the output of the algorithm, which is called
sensitivity method. The l2-sensitivity of a function is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 ([17]) The l2-sensitivity of a function f : Yn → Rk is
S2(f) = max
Y,Y ′∈Yn
dH(Y,Y
′)=1
‖f(Y )− f(Y ′)‖2. (2.2)
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The Gaussian mechanism is a typical sensitivity method that preserves (, δ)-differential
privacy.
Definition 2.3 ([17]) Given any function f : Yn → Rk, the Gaussian mechanism is defined
as
M(Y, f(·), ) = f(Y ) + (Y1, . . . , Yk), (2.3)
where Yi are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Gaussian distribution N (0, β2), where β =
S2(f)
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/.
The sensitivity of an algorithm measures the maximum difference in the output of the
algorithm under neighboring datasets, which is similar to the stability of the algorithm. An
algorithm is stable means that the output of the algorithm will vary little when given two very
similar date sets, and it also means that the sensitivity of the algorithm is low. When the
privacy parameters are fixed, the low sensitivity makes the differentially private algorithm add
small noise at high probability, which means high utility. Thus, a stable non-private algorithm
is suitable for development into a differentially private algorithm.
Moreover, differential privacy is closed under post-processing.
Proposition 2.4 ([17]) Let M is an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm. Let A is an arbi-
trary data-independent mapping. Then A ◦M is (, δ)-differentially private.
That is, a data analyst, without additional knowledge about the private dataset, cannot
compute a function of the output of a differentially private algorithm M and make it less
differentially private.
2.2 Alternating direction method of multipliers algorithm for the graphical lasso
The ADMM is an algorithm that is well suited to distributed convex optimization[16, 18]. The
algorithm solves optimization problems by decomposing them into smaller parts, and each part
is easier to handle. We might implement differential privacy by handling some of these parts.
Now we take the ADMM algorithm to solve the graphical lasso.
The graphical lasso problem (1.2) can be rewritten as
min
Θ,Z
− log |Θ|+ tr(SΘ) + λ‖Z‖1
s.t. Θ− Z = 0,
(2.4)
where Θ and Z are positive definite matrices.
Then we form the augmented Lagrangian function
L(Θ, Z, V ) = − log |Θ|+ tr(SΘ) + λ‖Z‖1 + V T (Θ− Z) + ρ
2
‖Θ− Z‖2F , (2.5)
where V ∈ Rp×p is the dual variable or Lagrange multiplier, and ρ > 0 is a preselected penalty
coefficient. Then the ADMM algorithm alternately updates variables by minimizing the aug-
mented Lagrangian function.
Let U = (1/ρ)V be the scaled dual variable. Using the scaled dual variable, the ADMM
algorithm for the graphical lasso is
Θk+1 = arg min
Θ
− log |Θ|+ tr(SΘ) + ρ
2
‖Θ− Zk + Uk‖2F , (2.6)
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Zk+1 = arg min
Z
λ‖Z‖1 + ρ
2
‖Θk+1 − Z + Uk‖2F , (2.7)
Uk+1 = Uk + Θk+1 − Zk+1. (2.8)
This algorithm can be simplified much further. Both Θ-minimization step (2.6) and Z-
minimization step (2.7) have analytical expression (see Boyd et al. [16] for details).
3 Methods
In this section, we first propose a differentially private ridge estimation for the precision matrix.
Then notice that the ADMM algorithm for the graphical lasso contains a ridge-type estimate
step. A differentially private algorithm for the graphical lasso problem is proposed.
3.1 Differentially private ridge estimation for the precision matrix
For the ridge estimation of the precision matrix, Kuismin et al.[13] showed that the maximizing
solution of (1.3) has the following closed form
Θ̂ = MΛMT , (3.1)
where Λ is a p× p diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are ϕ̂i = 2/(ϕi +
√
ϕ2i + 8λ), i =
1, . . . , p, sorted in ascending order beginning from the upper left corner Λ, that is, Λ =
diag(ϕ̂1, . . . , ϕ̂p), ϕ̂1 ≥ . . . ≥ ϕ̂p. Here ϕi’s are the eigenvalue of the sample covariance matrix
S. M is an orthogonal p× p matrix whose columns correspond to the eigenvectors of S, which
are ordered in the same order in which the sample covariance matrix eigenvalues appear in
the matrix Λ. Similarly, van Wieringen and Peeters [12] given a different form of analytical
solution to model (1.3). Both results showed that the ridge estimation of the precision matrix
has high stability, in other words, has low sensitivity. It is clear that the estimator (3.1) is
determined by the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of S when λ is fixed. Thus, the estimator will
preserve differential privacy as long as the orthogonal eigenvalue decomposition of S preserves
differential privacy.
Algorithm 1 Differentially private ridge estimation for the precision matrix (DP-RP)
Input: p× n matrix X, privacy parameters , δ > 0, tuning parameter λ > 0.
Output: Θ̂priv
1: Let S = XX
T
n .
2: Set β =
√
2
n
√
2 log(1.25/δ)
 , generate a p×p symmetric noisy matrix E whose entries are i.i.d.
drawn from N (0, β2).
3: S˜ ← S + E.
4: Compute Θ̂priv by (3.1) based on S˜.
Without loss of generality, the columns of the data matrix X are assumed to be normalized
to have l2 norm at most one, that is, ‖xi‖2 ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , n. We are interested in the sensitivity
of function f(X) = XXT /n,
S2(f) = max
X,X′∈Rp×n
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖F = ‖XX
T
n
− X
′X ′T
n
‖F ≤
√
2
n
, (3.2)
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where the function f(X) may be viewed as an p2-dimensional real vector. We use the Analyze
Gauss algorithm [19] to perturb S, which provides (, δ)-differential privacy. Then we perform
equation (3.1) on the perturbed S, which will yield a ridge estimate of the precision matrix
that is (, δ)-differentially private. See Algorithm 1 for details.
3.2 Differentially private algorithm for the graphical lasso
One algorithm for solving the graphical lasso problem is the ADMM algorithm in Section 2. The
ADMM algorithm for the graphical lasso consists of a Θ-minimization step, a Z-minimization
step and a scaled dual variable update. Obviously, the Θ-minimization step accesses the original
dataset directly, while the other steps only use the previous update results. Moreover, the Θ-
minimization step is a ridge-type penalty log-likelihood estimation similar to model (1.3).
Differential privacy is closed under post-processing, then solving the Θ-minimization step in
the k-th iteration by Algorithm 1 will make the k-th iteration provides (, δ)-differential privacy.
Note that when Algorithm 1 is used here, the analytical solution used in step 4 may be different
from (3.1) (see [12, 13, 16]). If the algorithm converges after K iterations, then the algorithm
provides (K,Kδ)-differential privacy follows from simple composition.
However, if the same privacy parameter of Algorithm 1 is used in each iteration, it is actually
equivalent to perturbing S with the same noise level in each iteration. Therefore, we can perturb
S directly before running the ADMM algorithm, which will avoid the accumulation of privacy
loss, that is, reduces privacy cost. We have the following differentially private ADMM algorithm
for the graphical lasso.
Algorithm 2 Differentially private ADMM algorithm for the graphical lasso (DP-AGL)
Input: p×n matrix X, privacy parameters , δ > 0, tuning parameter λ > 0, and initial values
Z0, U0.
Output: Θ̂priv
1: Let S = XX
T
n .
2: Set β =
√
2
n
√
2 log(1.25/δ)
 , generate a p×p symmetric noisy matrix E whose entries are i.i.d.
drawn from N (0, β2).
3: S˜ ← S + E.
4: Compute Θ̂priv by repeat (2.6)-(2.8) based on S˜ until convergence.
Theorem 3.1 Algorithms 1 and 2 are (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof By the definition of the Gaussian mechanism, we know that step 3 keeps the matrix
(, δ)-differentially private. Thus, due to the post-processing property of differential privacy,
Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-differentially private, and Algorithm 2 is also.
Remark 3.2 It should be noted that the noise addition mechanism in Algorithm 2 is the
same as [15], but we derived it from the perspective of the algorithm. The differential privacy
of Algorithm 2 is achieved by the differential privacy of Z-minimization step, so the differ-
ent privacy mechanism of this step will determine the different noise addition mechanism in
Algorithm 2. Moreover, this method of developing the differential privacy algorithm can be
extended to the development of the differential privacy algorithm for the regularized empirical
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risk minimization problem.
4 Theoretical analysis
In this section, we provide theoretical guarantees on the performance of privacy-preserving
precision matrix estimation algorithms in Section 3.
4.1 Differentially private ridge estimation for the precision matrix
We first provide performance theorem on Algorithm 1. We will show that the differentially
private ridge estimator for the precision matrix estimation is consistent under fixed-dimension
asymptotic.
Theorem 4.1 Let Θ̂priv be the output of Algorithm 1. Let Θ
∗ be the true precision matrix.
Then, if tuning parameter λ converges almost surely to zero as n → ∞, with high probability,
we have
lim
n→∞E
(
‖Θ̂priv −Θ∗‖2F
)
= 0. (4.1)
In this proof, we will need the following lemmas. The first had been proved in [20].
Lemma 4.2 ([20]) Let Θ1, Θ2 be positive definite matrices. For any ζ > 0, we have
‖Θ1 + ζΘ−11 − (Θ2 + ζΘ−12 )‖F ≤ max{|1−
ζ
a2
, |1− ζ
b2
|}‖Θ1 −Θ2‖F , (4.2)
where a = max{ϕmax(Θ1), ϕmax(Θ2)}, b = min{ϕmin(Θ1), ϕmin(Θ2)}. Here ϕmax and ϕmin
represent the maximum eigenvalue and the minimum eigenvalue, respectively.
The second comes from van Wieringen and Peeters [12], which shows the consistency of the
ridge estimator (3.1) under fixed-dimension asymptotic.
Lemma 4.3 ([12]) Let Θ̂ be the optimal solution of problem (1.3) and Θ∗ be the true precision
matrix. Then, if tuning parameter λ converges almost surely to zero as n→∞, we have
lim
n→∞E
(
‖Θ̂−Θ∗‖2F
)
= 0. (4.3)
We now prove the Theorem 4.1.
Proof By the triangular inequality,
‖Θ̂priv −Θ∗‖F ≤ ‖Θ̂priv − Θ̂‖F + ‖Θ̂−Θ∗‖F , (4.4)
here Θ̂ is the optimal solution of problem (1.3), which is (3.1).
First, we bound the first term on the right-hand side of (4.4). Let g = λ‖Θ‖2F and proxg
denote the proximity operator of g. Then for any ζ > 0,
‖Θ̂priv − Θ̂‖F = ‖proxζg(Θ̂priv − ζ(S˜ − Θ̂−1priv))− proxζg(Θ̂− ζ(S − Θ̂−1))‖F
≤ ‖Θ̂priv − ζ(S˜ − Θ̂−1priv)− (Θ̂− ζ(S − Θ̂−1))‖F
= ‖Θ̂priv + ζΘ̂−1priv − (Θ̂ + ζΘ̂−1)‖F + ζ‖S˜ − S‖F . (4.5)
The inequality uses the non-expansive property of the proximity operator [21]. By Lemma 4.2
and take 0 < ζ < min{ϕmin(Θ̂priv), ϕmin(Θ̂)}, we have
‖Θ̂priv − Θ̂‖F ≤ max{‖Θ̂‖22, ‖Θ̂priv‖22}‖E‖F . (4.6)
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Note that the entries in E are i.i.d. drawn from N (0, β2). Then, with high probability, we have
‖Θ̂priv − Θ̂‖F ≤ O(p
√
log(1/δ) max{‖Θ̂‖22, ‖Θ̂priv‖22}
n
). (4.7)
Take expectations on both sides of (4.7),
E
(
‖Θ̂priv − Θ̂‖F
)
≤ O(
p
√
log(1/δ)E
(
max{‖Θ̂‖22, ‖Θ̂priv‖22}
)
n
). (4.8)
Note that Θ̂ and Θ̂priv are always achieved, and thus E
(
max{‖Θ̂‖22, ‖Θ̂priv‖22}
)
is finite.
Take expectations on both sides of (4.4), then we arrive the conclusion by (4.8) and Lemma
4.3.
4.2 Differentially private algorithm for the graphical lasso
We now establish performance guarantees for Algorithm 2, by providing a rate of decay of its
error in Frobenius norm. Generally, let Θ̂priv be the optimal solution of problem (1.2) based on
S˜. Let set S1 = {(i, j) : Θ∗ij 6= 0, i 6= j}, with the cardinality s, denotes non-zero off-diagonal
entries in the precision matrix and SC1 be its complement. We provide the result as the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.4 Let Θ̂priv be the optimal solution of problem (1.2) based on S˜ with tuning
parameter λ  p
2
√
log(1/δ)
n +
√
log p
n . Let Θ
∗ be the true precision matrix. Then, if the smallest
and largest eigenvalues of the covariance matrix satisfy 0 < k ≤ ϕmin(Σ∗) ≤ ϕmax(Σ∗) ≤ k−1 <
∞, with high probability, we have
‖Θ̂priv −Θ∗‖F = O(p
2
√
s log(1/δ)
n
+
√
s log p
n
). (4.9)
In this proof, we will need a lemma of Bickel and Levina [22].
Lemma 4.5 ([22]) Let Zi be i.i.d. N (0,Σp) and ϕmax(Σp) ≤ k−1 <∞. Then if Σp = [σab],
P
[∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(ZijZik − σjk)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ nv
]
≤ c1 exp(−c2nv2) for |v| ≤ δ, (4.10)
where c1, c2 and δ depend on k only.
We now prove the Theorem 4.2.
Proof Let
Q(Θ) = − log |Θ|+ tr(S˜Θ) + λ‖Θ‖1 + log |Θ∗| − tr(S˜Θ∗)− λ‖Θ∗‖1
= −(log |Θ| − log |Θ∗|) + tr[(Θ−Θ∗)(S˜ − Σ∗)] + tr[(Θ−Θ∗)Σ∗]
+λ(‖Θ‖1 − ‖Θ∗‖1), (4.11)
The estimate Θ̂priv minimizes Q(Θ), or equivalently ∆̂ = Θ̂priv−Θ∗ minimizes G(∆) ≡ Q(Θ∗+
∆).
Consider the set
Jn(M) = {∆ : ∆ = ∆T , ‖∆‖F = Mrn}, where rn = p
2
√
s log(1/δ)
n
+
√
s log p
n
→ 0.
(4.12)
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Note that G(∆) = Q(Θ∗ + ∆) is a convex function, and G(∆̂) ≤ G(0) = 0. Then, if we can
show that
inf{G(∆) : ∆ ∈ Jn(M)} > 0, (4.13)
the minimizer ∆̂ must be inside the sphere defined by Jn(M), and hence
‖∆̂‖F ≤Mrn. (4.14)
By the Taylor expansion of f(t) = log |Θ + t∆|, we rewrite (4.11) as,
G(∆) = ∆˜T
[∫ 1
0
(1− v)(Θ∗ + v∆)−1 ⊗ (Θ∗ + v∆)−1dv
]
∆˜ + tr(∆(S˜ − Σ∗))
+λ(‖Θ∗ + ∆‖1 − ‖Θ∗‖1)
= I + II + III, (4.15)
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product and ∆˜ is ∆ vectorized to match the dimensions of the
Kronecker product.
Rothman et al. [23] had show that term I ≥ 14k2 with high probability.
To bound term II, we write
|tr(∆(S˜ − Σ∗))| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j
(Sij − Σ∗ij)∆ij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (4.16)
Note that the union sum inequality and Lemma 4.5 imply that, with high probability,
max
i,j
|S˜ij − Σ∗ij | ≤ max
i,j
|Sij − Σ∗ij |+ max
i,j
|Eij | ≤ c1
√
log p
n
+ c2
p2
√
log(1/δ)
n
, (4.17)
and hence term II is bounded by
II ≥ (−c1
√
log p
n
− c2 p
2
√
log(1/δ)
n
)‖∆‖1, (4.18)
here c1, c2 are positive constants.
Note that ‖Θ∗+ ∆‖1 = ‖Θ∗S1 + ∆S1‖1 + ‖Θ∗SC1 ‖1 + ‖∆SC1 ‖1 and ‖Θ
∗‖1 = ‖Θ∗S1‖1 + ‖Θ∗SC1 ‖1.
Then by triangular inequality, the third part
III = λ(‖Θ∗S1 + ∆S1‖1 + ‖∆SC1 ‖1 − ‖Θ
∗
S1‖1) ≥ λ(‖∆SC1 ‖1 − ‖∆S1‖1). (4.19)
Therefore, we have
G(∆) ≥ 1
4
k2‖∆‖2F − (c1
√
log p
n
+ c2
p2
√
log(1/δ)
n
)‖∆‖1 + λ(‖∆SC1 ‖1 − ‖∆S1‖1). (4.20)
Now, take
λ =
1
α
(c1
√
log p
n
+ c2
p2
√
log(1/δ)
n
), (4.21)
where α belongs to (0, 1). Then
G(∆) ≥ 1
4
k2‖∆‖2F − (c1
√
log p
n
+ c2
p2
√
log(1/δ)
n
)(1− 1
α
)‖∆SC1 ‖1
− (c1
√
log p
n
+ c2
p2
√
log(1/δ)
n
)(1 +
1
α
)‖∆S1‖1. (4.22)
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Since that the second term on the right-hand side of (4.22) is always negative and ‖∆S1‖1 ≤√
s‖∆S1‖F ≤
√
s‖∆‖F , we then have
G(∆) ≥ ‖∆‖2F
[
1
4
k2 − (c1
√
s log p
n
+ c2
p2
√
s log(1/δ)
n
)(1 +
1
α
)‖∆‖−1F
]
= ‖∆‖2F
[
1
4
k2 − c(1 + α)
αM
]
, (4.23)
here c = c1/c2.
Consequently, G(∆) > 0 for M sufficiently large. This establishes the theorem.
5 Experiments
5.1 Simulation
In this subsection, we conduct a simulation study to evaluate the performance of our proposed
differentially private algorithms. We consider four models as follows:
• Model 1. Θ = 1nWWT , where W is a p×n matrix with n = 10000 and each wi,j is drawn
from N (0, 1). This precision matrix is unstructured and non-sparse.
• Model 2. Full model with θi,j = 1 if i = j and θi,j = 0.5 otherwise. This precision matrix
is structured and non-sparse.
• Model 3. An AR(2) model with θi,i = 0, θi,i−1 = θi−1,i = 0.5 and θi,i−2 = θi−2,i = 0.25.
This precision matrix is structured and sparse.
• Model 4. The last model comes from Cai et al. [6]. Let Θ0 = A + αI, where each off-
diagonal entry in A is generated independently and equals 0.5 with probability 0.1 or 0
with probability 0.9. α is chosen such that the condition number (the ratio of the largest
and the smallest eigenvalues of a matrix) of the matrix is equal to p. Finally, the matrix
is standardized to have unit diagonal. This precision matrix is unstructured and sparse.
Firstly, we measure the difference between Θ̂priv and Θ̂, where Θ̂priv denotes the output
of our differentially private Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, the corresponding Θ̂ denotes the
solution of the problem (1.3) solved by equation (3.1) and the solution of the problem (1.2)
solved by the ADMM algorithm. For each model, we generate an independent sample of size
n from a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ = Θ−1,
and preprocess the data matrix by normalizing the data matrix with the maximum l2 norm to
enforce the condition ‖xi‖2 ≤ 1. A five-fold cross-validation described by Bien and Tibshirani
[24] is used to choose the parameter such that the optimal value of λ minimizes the negative
log-likelihood (1.1), and we compute the differentially private estimations on the same tuning
parameter λ as the non-private algorithm. We fixed p = 100 and consider different values of
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n 
Model1 Model2 Model3
l1 norm F norm l2 norm l1 norm F norm l2 norm l1 norm F norm l2 norm
100
0.1
2033.43 992.43 1952.80 2023.17 982.35 1937.40 2799.51 1397.73 2732.86
(214.65) (119.61) (217.19) (203.78) (105.55) (193.82) (187.39) (77.52) (157.59)
0.3
676.69 329.80 90.76 673.34 326.44 89.84 932.06 464.65 128.87
(71.54) (39.83) (11.44) (67.87) (35.14) (10.15) (62.48) (25.81) (7.55)
0.5
405.34 197.28 54.35 403.36 195.27 53.80 558.56 278.04 77.20
(42.92) (23.87) (6.86) (40.69) (21.06) (6.08) (37.50) (15.47) (4.53)
0.8
252.70 122.74 33.88 251.50 121.48 33.53 348.46 173.07 48.14
(26.82) (14.89) (4.28) (25.40) (13.14) (3.80) (23.45) (9.65) (2.83)
1.2
118.22 57.08 15.84 117.71 56.49 15.68 163.35 80.61 22.53
(12.64) (6.98) (2.01) (11.94) (6.16) (1.79) (11.10) (4.53) (1.33)
2
70.25 33.67 9.40 69.98 33.33 9.31 97.30 47.65 13.40
(7.58) (4.16) (1.20) (7.13) (3.67) (1.07) (6.70) (2.70) (0.80)
200
0.1
1640.76 773.12 1397.26 1639.64 782.21 1326.40 2634.83 1315.41 2277.36
(102.37) (39.26) (76.36) (95.85) (38.54) (69.81) (171.50) (82.98) (156.16)
0.3
545.36 256.42 70.62 544.96 259.44 71.45 876.13 436.65 121.23
(34.07) (13.07) (4.00) (31.92) (12.84) (3.85) (57.08) (27.64) (8.52)
0.5
326.27 153.08 42.24 326.02 154.89 42.74 524.37 260.90 72.56
(20.41) (7.84) (2.40) (19.14) (7.69) (2.31) (34.21) (16.57) (5.11)
0.8
203.03 94.97 26.28 202.85 96.09 26.59 326.49 162.05 45.18
(12.73) (4.89) (1.50) (11.96) (4.80) (1.44) (21.36) (10.35) (3.19)
1.2
94.44 43.78 12.22 94.34 44.31 12.37 152.20 74.99 21.06
(5.96) (2.29) (0.70) (5.63) (2.25) (0.68) (10.12) (4.86) (1.50)
2
55.70 25.55 7.20 55.63 25.86 7.29 90.01 43.97 12.46
(3.56) (1.37) (0.42) (3.37) (1.34) (0.41) (6.08) (2.90) (0.90)
400
0.1
1328.60 578.15 1040.17 1347.95 592.49 859.38 2589.53 1208.54 1934.99
(73.95) (31.23) (59.22) (75.70) (31.00) (45.65) (105.15) (39.34) (62.87)
0.3
440.65 191.07 52.75 447.01 195.82 54.04 859.69 400.10 111.19
(24.63) (10.39) (3.14) (25.17) (10.31) (3.03) (35.10) (13.00) (4.11)
0.5
263.04 113.67 31.49 266.81 116.50 32.26 513.76 238.43 66.43
(14.76) (6.22) (1.88) (15.07) (6.18) (1.82) (21.15) (7.73) (2.46)
0.8
163.13 70.14 19.53 165.43 71.89 20.00 319.19 147.51 41.25
(9.21) (3.88) (1.17) (9.39) (3.85) (1.13) (13.34) (4.77) (1.53)
1.2
75.09 31.83 9.00 76.12 32.63 9.21 147.72 67.46 19.08
(4.32) (1.81) (0.55) (4.37) (1.80) (0.53) (6.45) (2.17) (0.72)
2
43.70 18.21 5.24 44.27 18.67 5.37 86.54 38.97 11.18
(2.60) (1.07) (0.33) (2.57) (1.06) (0.32) (3.94) (1.24) (0.42)
Table 1 Simulation results for differentially private Algorithm 1 in Model 1-3. Average (standard
error) matrix losses over 50 replications.
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n 
Model2 Model3 Model4
l1 norm F norm l2 norm l1 norm F norm l2 norm l1 norm F norm l2 norm
100
0.1
82.90 9.45 26.23 80.19 9.45 26.09 67.15 9.42 26.02
(2.78) (0.17) (0.83) (2.72) (0.16) (0.83) (3.38) (0.16) (0.83)
0.3
27.27 2.98 0.83 26.45 2.99 0.83 22.18 2.98 0.83
(0.94) (0.05) (0.03) (0.92) (0.05) (0.03) (1.14) (0.05) (0.03)
0.5
16.31 1.75 0.48 15.87 1.75 0.48 13.32 1.75 0.48
(0.57) (0.03) (0.02) (0.56) (0.03) (0.02) (0.69) (0.03) (0.02)
0.8
10.22 1.08 0.28 9.98 1.09 0.29 8.39 1.09 0.29
(0.36) (0.02) (0.01) (0.35) (0.02) (0.01) (0.43) (0.02) (0.01)
1.2
4.85 0.52 0.12 4.80 0.52 0.12 4.05 0.53 0.12
(0.17) (0.01) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01) (0.00) (0.20) (0.01) (0.00)
2
2.88 0.31 0.07 2.89 0.32 0.07 2.46 0.32 0.07
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)
200
0.1
44.10 4.91 13.68 42.76 4.91 13.61 36.09 4.90 13.59
(1.49) (0.09) (0.44) (1.40) (0.09) (0.44) (1.67) (0.09) (0.44)
0.3
14.61 1.55 0.42 14.23 1.56 0.42 12.03 1.56 0.42
(0.51) (0.03) (0.01) (0.48) (0.03) (0.01) (0.57) (0.03) (0.01)
0.5
8.83 0.93 0.24 8.63 0.94 0.24 7.31 0.94 0.24
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01) (0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
0.8
5.57 0.59 0.14 5.48 0.59 0.14 4.65 0.59 0.14
(0.20) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00) (0.22) (0.01) (0.00)
1.2
2.61 0.28 0.06 2.62 0.29 0.06 2.23 0.29 0.06
(0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
2
1.52 0.16 0.03 1.56 0.17 0.04 1.34 0.17 0.04
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
400
0.1
23.31 2.52 6.98 22.74 2.52 6.95 19.29 2.52 6.94
(0.80) (0.04) (0.23) (0.79) (0.04) (0.23) (0.79) (0.04) (0.23)
0.3
7.87 0.83 0.21 7.72 0.83 0.21 6.57 0.83 0.21
(0.28) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
0.5
4.79 0.50 0.12 4.72 0.51 0.12 4.02 0.51 0.12
(0.16) (0.01) (0.00) (0.16) (0.01) (0.00) (0.16) (0.01) (0.00)
0.8
3.00 0.32 0.07 2.98 0.32 0.07 2.55 0.32 0.07
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
1.2
1.37 0.15 0.03 1.40 0.15 0.03 1.21 0.15 0.03
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
2
0.79 0.09 0.02 0.83 0.09 0.02 0.72 0.09 0.02
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 2 Simulation results for differentially private Algorithm 2 in Model 2-4. Average (standard
error) matrix losses over 50 replications.
n = 100, 200, 400 and change  = 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1.2, 2. For each experiments, we set δ = 1/n and
replicate 50 times. In addition, the preselected penalty coefficient is set to ρ = 100, We measure
the estimation quality by the following matrix norms: the matrix l1 norm ‖Θ̂priv − Θ̂‖1/‖Θ̂‖1,
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(b) Model 4
Figure 1 ROC curves for varying levels of privacy parameter , compared with the non-private
algorithm.
the Frobenius norm ‖Θ̂priv − Θ̂‖F /‖Θ̂‖F , and the spectral norm ‖Θ̂priv − Θ̂‖2/‖Θ̂‖2. Tabel 1
and Tabel 2 report the averages and standard errors of these losses.
As shown in Tabel 1 and Tabel 2, the high sample size and high privacy budget setting
will have smaller matrix norm losses. First, we study how the loss of our differentially private
algorithms is affected by . As  increase, these losses are reduced in both structured or
unstructured, sparse or non-sparse models. This is in line with our additive-noise algorithm,
where noise level is inversely proportional to privacy parameter, that is, larger  means less noise
and more utility. Next, we investigate the performance of our differentially private algorithms
when the sample size varies. As the sample size n increases while  being fixed, all three losses
show increasing estimation performance.
Secondly, focus on the structural learning of the Gaussian graphical model, we test the
ability of our differentially private Algorithm 2 to recover the support of the precision matrix
by ROC curves. ROC curves reflect the overall selection performance of each method as the
tuning parameter varies, in which the true positive rate (TPR) is plotted against the false
positive rate (FPR). For Model 3 and Model 4, we generate a sample of size n = 2000 and
preprocess the data matrix. We fixed p = 20, δ = 0.001, ρ = 100 and let  vary in {1, 2}. For
each setting, we replicate 50 times. Smoothed average ROC curves are shown in Figure 1.
From Figure 1, we see that the model selection ability of our differentially private Algorithm 2
is almost comparable to the non-private algorithm with proper parameters setting.
5.2 Application to real data
5.2.1 Classification of Ionosphere Data
The first example deals with the Ionosphere data from UCI repository [25]. This radar data was
collected by a system in Goose Bay, Labrador. This system consists of a phased array of 16 high-
frequency antennas. The targets were free electrons in the ionosphere. “Good” radar returns
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are those showing evidence of some type of structure in the ionosphere. “Bad” returns are those
that do not, their signals pass through the ionosphere. The data contains 351 observations with
34 variables. The response is labelled as 1 for “Good” and −1 for “Bad”. As a classification
problem, we apply linear discriminant analysis (LDA) with an differentially private precision
matrix estimate. The purpose here is to illustrate how the ridge estimation of the precision
matrix under different privacy parameters  can affect the classification performance of LDA.
We randomly divide the data into a training set, a validation set and a test set. The training
set is used to estimate the precision matrix. The validation set is used to choose the tuning
parameter for the method. The misclassification error is computed based on the test set. The
sizes of the training set and the validation set are chosen to be n = 40. We set δ = 0.001
and repeat this procedure 50 times. The misclassification errors are present Figure 2. Figure 2
shows that there is a large gap between the result of the differentially private algorithm and the
result of the non-private algorithm when  is small, but the gap becomes smaller as  increases.
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Figure 2 The misclassification errors of LDA
5.2.2 Cell signalling data
In this subsection, we apply our differentially private Algorithm 2 to the cell signalling data
[26] to evaluate its performance. The dataset containing 7466 cells, with flow cytometry mea-
surements of 11 phosphorylated proteins and phospholipids, i.e., n = 7466 and p = 11. They
also provided a causal protein-signaling network, shown in Figure 3a. Friedman et al. [5] used
to apply graphical lasso to this data.
We compare the performance of our differentially private Algorithm 2 and non-private
algorithm in reconstructing network edges by the ROC curve. To remove the randomness of
the additive noise, we replicate 50 times. We fixed preselected penalty coefficient ρ = 100
and privacy parameter δ = 0.001. The resulting ROC curve is shown in Figure 3b, where the
network in Figure 3a was used as a benchmark (here we regard it as an undirected graph). The
ROC curve shows that our differential privacy Algorithm 2 has high utility. We randomly show
reconstructed networks with different tuning parameter λ in Figure 4.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on developing differentially private algorithms for solving the
ridge estimation of the precision matrix and the graphical lasso problem. We first present a
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Figure 3 (a)Directed acyclic graph from cell-signaling data, from Sachs et al. [26]. (b)ROC curves
for varying levels of privacy parameter , compared with the non-private algorithm.
differentially private ridge estimation for the precision matrix. Then based on this algorithm and
ADMM algorithm, a differentially private algorithm for the graphical lasso problem has been
proposed. We compare our differentially private algorithms with the non-private algorithms
through different privacy budget and sample size under simulation and real data, which show
that our developed differentially private algorithms provide fine utility.
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Figure 4 Undirected graphs from DP-ALG with different values of tuning parameter λ and privacy
parameter , compared with undirected graphs from the non-private algorithm. The tuning
parameter λ corresponding to the subgraphs in the horizontal lines is 0.0015, 0.002, respectively. The
first column of subgraphs corresponds to the non-private algorithm and  of the subgraphs
corresponding to the last two columns is 1, 2, respectively.
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